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The paper studies the revenue, efficiency, and distributional implications of a simple strategy 
of offsetting tariff reductions with increases in destination-based consumption taxes so as to 
leave consumer prices unchanged. We employ a dynamic micro-founded macroeconomic 
model of a small open developing economy, which features an informal sector that cannot be 
taxed, a formal agricultural sector, and an import-substitution sector. The reform strategy 
increases government revenue, imports, exports, and the informal sector. In contrast to Emran 
and Stiglitz (2005), who ignore the dynamic effects of taxes and tariffs on factor markets, we 
find an efficiency gain, which is unevenly distributed. Existing generations benefit more than 
future generations, who - depending on pre-existing tax and tariff rates and the informal 
sector size - even may become worse off. 
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Tari revenue of low-income countries has declined from 5.4 percent of GDP in 1985 to 3.4
percent of GDP in 2000, which is primarily driven by their trade liberalization programs.
Nevertheless, trade taxes continue to be the major source of revenue for these nations: tari
revenue accounted on average for 30 percent of total tax revenue during 1990{2000 compared
with only 1 percent in OECD countries.1 Washington-based nancial institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have strongly advocated tari
cuts coupled with tax measures to recoup the potential public revenue losses. Much of the
discussion on alternative revenue sources has focused on consumption taxes like the value-
added tax (VAT). Policy prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank are typically based
on the (presumed) eciency gain of these integrated tax-tari reforms. Recently, Emran and
Stiglitz (2005) have challenged the validity of this prescription by pointing to the eciency
loss induced by the presence of a \hard-to-tax" informal sector.2 Our paper contributes to this
debate. More specically, we show that the Washington-based policy line remains valid|even
when a substantial informal sector exists|once allowance is made for factor market dynamics.
There is a large informal literature discussing potential measures to oset the revenue loss
of tari reform. See, for example, Mitra (1999). Early theoretical analyses primarily focus
on the welfare eects of tari cuts (cf. Hatta, 1977). Such taris cuts, however, typically
imply a tari revenue loss for developing countries. The sparse literature on coordinated
tax-tari reforms acknowledges countries' budget constraints and studies tax measures to
oset the associated revenue losses. Early contributions are those by Hatzipanayotou et al.
(1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002), who nd that integrated tax-tari reforms increase
both government revenue and welfare.3 Intuitively, the reform reduces the static implicit
production subsidy at an unchanged consumption tax distortion. Recently, the desirability of
integrated reform strategies has been under discussion. The main result may break down when
allowance is made for important features of reality such as an informal sector (cf. Emran and
Stiglitz, 2005), imperfect competition on the goods market (cf. Haque and Mukherjee, 2005;
and Keen and Ligthart, 2005), and tax administration costs (cf. Munk, 2008). The existing
literature typically employs static (partial) equilibrium frameworks to analyze piecemeal tax-
tari reforms and thus can neither take into account important eects on domestic factor
markets nor consider transitional dynamics.4
1See Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp (1999) and World Bank (2009). Income groups are dened by the World
Bank classication.
2See Schneider and Enste (2000) for an overview of the size, causes, and economic consequences of informal
sector activities.
3Boadway and Sato (2009) take a dierent perspective by constructing a general model of optimal tax
design in an economy with an informal sector. They compare a VAT regime with a trade tax regime and
identify the circumstances that determine which of the two is preferred on eciency grounds.
4Notable exceptions are Naito (2006) and Heijdra and Ligthart (2010). Their models neither feature an
informal sector nor allow for distributional issues.
1Our work is most closely related to Emran and Stiglitz (2005), who acknowledge the
incomplete coverage of VAT due to the existence of an informal sector. Employing a model
with xed factor endowments, they investigate the welfare eect of an integrated tax-tari
reform so as to leave government revenue unchanged. While a radial tari reduction is shown
to alleviate both consumption and production distortions, the revenue-neutral increase in the
VAT reinforces the consumption distortion across formal and informal sectors.5 Emran and
Stiglitz (2005) nd that such a reform reduces welfare under plausible conditions, leading
them to conclude that `...the results derived earlier in the literature are unhelpful at best
and potentially misleading as the basis of indirect tax policy reform in developing countries'
(Emran and Stiglitz, 2005, p. 618).6 However, although Emran and Stiglitz (2005) take
into account the static output distortion induced by the import tari, their model ignores the
dynamic distortion of the tari. In a dynamic setting, taris aect rms' investment decisions
and thereby the accumulation of physical capital. Given that import-competing sectors are
typically much more capital intensive than the rest of the economy (including the informal
sector), the import tari is relatively more distorting compared to the consumption tax than
it is in the static analysis of Emran and Stiglitz (2005).
This paper studies the revenue, eciency, and intergenerational welfare eects of a reform
strategy of cutting taris and increasing destination-based consumption taxes so as to leave
domestic consumer prices unchanged. To this end, we construct a dynamic macroeconomic
model of a small open developing economy. Our analysis explicitly considers an informal sector
and factor market dynamics. The strategy of keeping consumer prices xed allows us to focus
on the eects of a change in the composition of the combined burden of consumption taxes and
taris rather than the level of the tax burden, implying that all eciency gains/losses from
the reform materialize as a change in the market value of aggregate consumption. Besides
being analytically simple, this strategy is also practical. Compared with a revenue-neutral
reform|which requires an analysis of time-varying consumption tax rates|all that is needed
is information on the current marginal tari and tax rates.
We consider a model in which households are nitely lived, building on the work of Yaari
(1965) and Blanchard (1985). In line with the economic structure of a typical developing
country, households engage in home production.7 Because of measurement problems, this
kind of informal output neither enters the national accounts nor can be taxed (cf. Tanzi,
1999). The home production specication builds on the real business cycle (RBC) literature
5Emran and Stiglitz's (2005) analysis concerns the case of a selective tax-tari reform, which contrary to
a radial reform only applies to a subset of the commodities subject to the tax and the tari. However, they
claim that the results go through for a radial reform, which they work out in an (unpublished) paper.
6Keen (2008) argues that Emran and Stiglitz (2005) underestimate the extent to which the VAT is able to
tax the informal sector, because the VAT functions as a tax on the purchases (including imports) of rms in
the informal sector (which cannot claim an input tax credit).
7As Schneider (2002, p. 30) notes, informal activities in developing countries are primarily related to
household production.
2(cf. Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright, 1991; Parente, Rogerson, and Wright, 2000; and
Campbell and Ludvigson, 2001).8 In our framework, rms operate in two market sectors,
that is, an export sector and an import-substitution sector. Following Brock and Turnovsky
(1993), the export sector produces an agricultural good using labor and a sector-specic factor
(land), whereas the import-substitution sector produces a manufactured good employing labor
and imported physical capital as a sector-specic factor. Both goods and factor markets are
perfectly competitive. Labor is perfectly mobile across the informal and formal sector and
within the formal sector.9 To avoid trivial capital dynamics, capital accumulation is subject
to adjustment costs.
We solve the model analytically and provide numerical illustrations of the transitional
allocation eects and welfare eects of a tax-tari reform. To this latter end, we simulate the
model for empirically plausible parameter values. The reform strategy is shown to increase
government revenue and market access in the long run, that is, steady-state imports and
exports rise.10 In addition, both the informal and formal agricultural sector expand at the
expense of the import-substitution sector; however, informal agricultural output rises rela-
tively more. Aggregate formal employment and output fall, more so in the long run than
in the short run. The qualitative allocation eects are robust to changes in the size of the
informal sector. In contrast to Emran and Stiglitz (2005), we nd an eciency gain under
plausible conditions. Intuitively, the reform alleviates the tari distortion (yielding too much
production and too little consumption of import substitutes) more than it exacerbates the
consumption tax distortion (giving rise to excess home production). More specically, in
addition to a static eciency gain, lower tari rates also generate an intertemporal eciency
gain; that is, taris reduce the larger than socially optimal physical capital stock in the
import-substitution sector. The welfare change is unequally distributed across generations.
Old existing generations benet more than young generations. Future generations may even
become worse o, depending on the pre-existing tax and tari rates and the share of informal
output in GDP.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out a micro-founded model of a small open
economy extended with an informal sector. Section 3 describes the solution procedure. Sec-
tion 4 studies the dynamic allocation eects of a consumer-price neutral tax-tari reform
strategy in which taris on imported consumption goods are lowered and destination-based
consumption taxes are increased. Section 5 studies the dynamic eciency and intergenera-
8Pigott and Whally (2001) investigate a VAT base broadening while allowing for household production.
However, they do not consider taris and calibrate their model for Canada. Turnovsky and Basher (2009)
employ a dynamic macroeconomic model in which rms rather than households produce informal goods. They
focus on a closed economy and therefore do not touch upon tari reform issues.
9We use the terms home production, informal sector, and shadow economy interchangeably.
10Anderson and Neary (2007) show that welfare-improving tari reforms in general do not coincide with
market access-improving tari reforms. Nevertheless, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Mller (2008) succeed in
deriving a revenue-neutral tax-tari reform that increases welfare, market access, and government revenue.
3tional welfare eects. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This section sets out the dynamic micro-founded model of a small open developing country.
We subsequently discuss behavior of individual households, aggregate households, rms, and
the government.
2.1 Individual Households
Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), individual households face a constant proba-
bility of death  > 0, which equals the rate at which new agents are born. Consequently, the
population size is constant and can thus be normalized to unity. Households are disconnected
and therefore do not leave bequests. Actuarially fair annuity markets allow households to bor-
row and lend funds at the exogenously given world rate of interest adjusted for the probability
of death.
Expected lifetime utility at time t of a representative household born at time v  t is





where  is the pure rate of time preference. Consumption is discounted at the eective
discount rate  + , reecting the positive death rate. The aggregate consumption index
C(v;t) is given by:
C(v;t)  CM(v;t)"CA(v;t)1 "; 0 < " < 1; (2)
which is dened over a manufactured good CM(v;t) and a composite agricultural good
CA(v;t). The parameter " represents the consumption share of manufactured goods. House-
holds can either choose to buy CE(v;t) agricultural goods on the market or produce CS(v;t)
of these goods at home:11
CA(v;t)  CE(v;t) + CS(v;t): (3)
The household allocates its total time available, which we have normalized to unity, be-
tween working LF(v;t) hours in the market sector and working LS(v;t) hours at home (so-
called informal employment). The household's home production function is given by:
CS(v;t) = YS(v;t) = 
SLS(v;t)1 S; 0 < S < 1; 
S > 0; (4)
11This specication is warranted because home and market goods are typically close substitutes in developing
countries (Parente, Rogerson, and Wright, 2000, p. 683).
4where 
S is a productivity index, YS(v;t) is home production, and 1   S is the output
elasticity of time devoted to home production. Equation (4) says that home production of
generation v is fully consumed by the representative household of that generation. All implicit
income earned in the informal sector is attributed to labor.
The household's ow budget constraint is:
_ A(v;t) = (r + )A(v;t) + w(t)LF(v;t) + T(t)   pM(t)CM(v;t)   pE(t)CE(v;t); (5)
where _ A(v;t)  dA(v;t)=dt, A(v;t) denotes real nancial wealth, r is the world rate of interest,
w(t) is the (age-independent) real wage rate, LF(v;t) is total employment in the market sector,
T(t) are lump-sum transfers, pM(t) is the domestic consumer price of manufactured goods,
and pE(t) is the domestic consumer price of agricultural goods produced in the export sector.
We choose the exported agricultural good as the numeraire. The world market prices of
agricultural and manufactured goods are exogenously given. Hence, we can normalize them
to unity. The domestic consumer prices of manufactured and agricultural goods produced in
the market are dened as:
pM(t)  (1 + tC(t))(1 + M(t)); pE(t)  1 + tC(t); (6)
where M(t) is an ad valorem import tari on imported manufactured goods and tC(t) denotes
an ad valorem destination-based consumption tax (which is applied to the tari-inclusive
import price, in line with international practice).
The representative household of cohort v chooses time proles for CM(v;t), CE(v;t), and
CS(v;t) to maximize (v;t) subject to its ow budget constraint (5), the home production
function (4), and a No-Ponzi-Game solvency condition. By solving this optimization problem,










SLS(v;t) S = w(t); (8)
_ X(v;t)
X(v;t)
= r   ; (9)
where pA(t) is the price index of composite agricultural consumption and full consumption
X(v;t) is dened as the market value of aggregate consumption:
X(v;t)  pC(t)C(v;t) = pM(t)CM(v;t) + pA(t)CA(v;t); (10)
where pC(t) is the true price index of the aggregate consumption index:
pC(t) = CpM(t)"pA(t)1 "; C 

""(1   ")1 " 1 > 0: (11)
Because CE(v;t) and CS(v;t) are perfect substitutes, the shadow price of home production
pS(t) equals that of the agricultural good produced in the market: pS(t) = pE(t) = pA(t).
5Condition (7) sets the marginal rate of substitution between agricultural goods and imported
goods equal to their relative price. Equation (7) says that the value of the marginal product
of time devoted to informal activities should be equal to the real market wage rate. According
to (8), optimal individual full consumption growth is given by the dierence between the real
interest rate and the pure rate of time preference. We consider the case of a patient nation for
which r >  holds. By integrating (5), and using (8) and (10), it follows that full consumption
of the representative household is a xed fraction of total wealth:
X(v;t) = ( + )[A(v;t) + H(v;t)]; (12)




[w(z)LF(v;z) + T(z) + pS(z)YS(v;z)]e (r+)(z t)dz; (13)
which equals the expected discounted value of the current and future returns to labor, which
consists of formal wage income, lump-sum transfers, and all implicit income earned in the
shadow economy.
2.2 Aggregate Household Sector
Aggregate variables can be calculated from the individual variables by integrating over all
existing generations while noting that in each period the number of newborns  is equal to
the number of households that pass away. We assume large cohorts, so that frequencies and
probabilities coincide by the law of large numbers. Therefore, aggregate full consumption, for





The aggregate values for other variables can be derived in a similar fashion. By taking the
time derivative of (14), the aggregate version of (8) is obtained:
_ X(t)
X(t)










Aggregate full consumption growth diers from individual full consumption growth because
of the generational turnover eect (cf. Heijdra and Ligthart, 2007). On the one hand, the
birth of new generations has a positive eect on aggregate consumption growth (represented
by the term X(t;t) on the right-hand side of the second equality sign). On the other hand,
the death of old generations has a negative eect on aggregate growth, reecting that they
cease to consume (represented by the term  X(t)). Because old generations are wealthier
than newborn households, they consume more. Consequently, on balance, aggregate full
consumption growth falls short of individual full consumption growth.





Because the real wage rate is the same for every generation, it follows from (7) that the level
of individual informal production is independent of the household's age. Hence, we know
that individual informal production and aggregate informal production coincide: YS(t) =
YS(v;t).12
2.3 Firms
Production of market goods takes place in an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector.
Formal agricultural rms produce predominantly for the export market, but also sell products
on the domestic market. Domestic manufacturing rms compete with foreign rms that
produce a perfect substitute for the manufactured commodity. Both sectors are perfectly
competitive, yielding zero excess prots.
2.3.1 Export Sector





E LE(t)1 E; 0 < E < 1; 
E > 0; (17)
where 
E is a productivity index, LE(t) is employment in the export sector, ZE denotes the
xed factor land, and 1   E is the output elasticity of labor in the agricultural sector. The
representative rm in the export sector maximizes its net operating surplus:
E(t)  YE(t)   w(t)LE(t)   rZ(t)ZE; (18)
where rZ(t) is the rental rate on land. We assume that the government cannot tax land.13
The rst-order conditions characterizing the rm's optimal plans are













The rst expression yields the labor demand curve in the export sector. The land rentals|
which are distributed to households|are equal to the rm's gross operating surplus, that is,
 E(t) = EYE(t) = rZ(t)ZE.
12Aggregate variables and variables averaged over all generations are equal, because of the normalization of
the population size to unity.
13If the government were to have access to a land tax|which is a non-distortionary source of revenue given
that land is a xed factor|then it becomes hard to justify why the government employs distortionary taris
and consumption taxes.
72.3.2 Import-Substitution Sector
The representative rm in the import-substitution sector produces YM(t) according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology:
YM(t) = 
MK(t)MLM(t)1 M; 0 < M < 1; 
M > 0; (20)
where 
M is a productivity index, LM(t) is employment in the import-substitution sector,
K(t) denotes the physical capital stock, and M is the output elasticity of physical capital
in the manufacturing sector. Capital goods can only be imported, do not bear any tari or
tax, and are subject to adjustment costs. Following Uzawa (1969), the rm faces a strictly











where  > 0 is the constant rate of capital depreciation and I(t) denotes gross investment.
The accumulation function has the following properties: 	(0) = 0, 	0() > 0, and 	00() < 0:
Because of adjustment costs, physical capital is less mobile in the short run than in the long
run. The degree of physical capital immobility is given by    (I=K)	00=	0 > 0, where a
small  characterizes a high degree of capital mobility. Note that the limiting case of  ! 0
(i.e., no adjustment costs) corresponds to perfect capital mobility.




[(1 + M(z))YM(z)   w(z)LM(z)   I(z)]e r(z t)dz; (22)
subject to the production function (20), the accumulation equation (21), and a transversality
condition: limz!1 q(z)K(z)e r(z t) = 0, where q(t) denotes Tobin's q, which measures the
market value of physical capital relative to its replacement costs. The rm takes the (positive)
initial stock of physical capital as given. We have normalized the price of imported capital
goods to unity. The optimization procedure yields the following rst-order conditions:

































Equation (23) yields labor demand conditional on the physical capital stock. Investment
demand is given by (24), which is a positive function of Tobin's q. Equation (25) describes
the evolution of Tobin's q, which ensures that the return on physical capital (the left-hand
side) equals the user costs of physical capital (the right-hand side). The return on physical
capital is the sum of the shadow capital gains/losses and the marginal product of capital. The
8user costs of physical capital consist of the interest rate, the depreciation rate, and the term
between brackets, which captures the eect of investment on future adjustment costs. Because
the adjustment function is strictly concave, the bracketed term is positive. Intuitively, current
investment increases the future capital stock, thereby lowering future adjustment costs.14
2.4 Government
The government levies taxes on consumption in the formal sector, but cannot tax consumption
of informal goods.15 In addition, the government imposes taris on imported consumption
goods. In line with international practice, all consumption taxes are destination-based, im-
plying that exported goods are zero-rated and imported goods are taxed. The government
distributes tax revenues to households in a lump-sum fashion. Hence, the government's budget
identity is given by:
T(t) = tC(t)[CE(t) + (1 + M(t))CM(t)] + M(t)[CM(t)   YM(t)]: (26)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (26) represents consumption tax revenue, where we
take into consideration that consumption taxes are levied on the domestic consumption of
CE(t) and the tari-inclusive value of CM(t). The second term denotes tari revenue from
imported consumption goods.
2.5 Foreign Sector
Given the relative market prices, the small open economy imports XM(t) = CM(t) + I(t)  
YM(t) of the manufactured good and exports XE(t) = YE(t) CE(t) of the formal agricultural
good. The trade account of the balance of payments is obtained by subtracting imports from
exports: XE(t) XM(t) = YM(t)+YE(t) [CM(t)+CE(t)+I(t)], showing that market output
YM(t) + YE(t) less domestic (market) absorption CE(t) + CM(t) + I(t) equals aggregate net
exports. The evolution of net foreign assets is then given by:
_ F(t) = rF(t) + XE(t)   XM(t): (27)
National solvency is retained provided the initial value of net foreign assets equals the present




[XE(z)   XM(z)]e r(z t)dz: (28)
14Without adjustment costs, we have 	() = I(t)=K(t), which yields  = 0. Equation (24) then reduces to
q = 1. In this case, q(t) and K(t) adjust instantaneously to their steady-state levels. Consequently, equation
(25) collapses to (1 + M)
@YM
@K = r + ; which is the familiar rental rate derived in a static framework.
15Tax evasion in the informal sector is assumed to be 100 percent. We thus abstract from the possibility of
tax audits as in Turnovsky and Basher (2009).
92.6 Market Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market is given by: YM(t) + YE(t) + XM(t) = CM(t) + CE(t) +
I(t) + XE(t), where the right-hand side shows the sources of aggregate demand. We dene
the country's Gross Domestic Product (valued at domestic market prices) as: Y (t) = (1 +
tC(t))[(1 + M(t))YM(t) + YE(t)]. In line with international practice, ocial GDP does not
include any output produced in the informal economy.
Labor market equilibrium requires that LF(t) + LS(t) = 1, where aggregate formal em-
ployment is LF(t) = LE(t) + LM(t) and aggregate informal employment is LS(t). Because
informal employment is inversely related to the wage rate and total time is normalized to
unity, aggregate formal employment rises with the wage rate. Financial market equilibrium
implies that household's aggregate claim on assets equals the sum of the value of the domestic
physical capital stock VK(t), the value of the stock of land VZ(t), and net foreign assets:
A(t) = VK(t) + VZ(t) + F(t): (29)
The stock market value of import-competing rms is given by VK(t)  q(t)K(t). All nancial
assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Arbitrage ensures that land attracts the market
rate of return, which consists of the sum of the capital gain _ VZ(t) and the rental rate rZ(t):
rVZ(t) = _ VZ(t) + rZ(t); (30)
where we have normalized the constant stock of land to unity, that is, ZE = 1.
3 Solving the Model
This section solves the model, describes its dynamic properties, and discusses the parameters
used in the numerical simulations of Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Steady State
To analyze the dynamic properties of the model, we log-linearize it around an initial steady
state (Table A1). A tilde (~) denotes a relative change for most variables (e.g., ~ X(t) 
dX(t)=X), except for nancial variables, lump-sum transfers, tax rates, and taris rates (see
Appendix A.1 for a further discussion). Time derivatives of variables are generally dened
as _ ~ X(t)  _ X(t)=X. The model can be reduced to a four dimensional dynamic system, which
consists of two predetermined variables [ ~ K(t); ~ A(t)] and two non-predetermined or forward-
looking variables [~ q(t); ~ X(t)]. Because the dynamic system is recursive, the investment sub-
system [~ q(t); ~ K(t)] can be solved independent of the savings subsystem [ ~ X(t); ~ A(t)]. The
model is locally saddle-point stable; its stability properties are summarized in Proposition 1.
10Proposition 1 The model is locally saddle-point stable if r < +, where 0 <   [1+(1 
")M]=[(1+tC)(1+M)] < 1. The dynamic system can be decomposed in two subsystems|one
for investment and one for savings|with the following properties:
(i) the investment system has two distinct real eigenvalues; that is,  h
1 < 0 and r
1 =
h
1 + r > 0 with @h
1=@ < 0, lim!0 h
1 = 1, and lim!1 h
1 = 0; and
(ii) the savings system has two distinct real eigenvalues; that is,  h
2 < 0 and r
2 = h
2 +
2r    > 0 with @h
2=@ > 0 and lim!1 h
2 = 1.
Proof. See Appendices A.2 and A.3. 
Deferring technical details to Appendix A.2 and dropping time indices, the investment
system can be written as:




















where 12  r!I=(!K) > 0, 21  r(!M
L )2MSE=(j





L > 0 is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the
labor market equilibrium (Appendix A.1). The GDP shares of the respective variables are
dened as: !I  I=Y , !K  rqK=Y , and !i
L = wLi=Y for i = fM;E;Sg. The elements in


























and the shock terms are dened as ~ M  dM=(1+M) and ~ tC  dtC=(1+tC). The investment
system can be graphically summarized by the phase diagram in Panel (a) of Figure 1. The
_ ~ K = 0 line represents combinations of ~ q and ~ K for which net investment is zero. The schedule
is horizontal at ~ q = 0; which corresponds to the steady-state value of Tobin's q for which
	(:) = . ~ q-values exceeding ~ q yield positive net investment. Conversely, ~ q-values falling
short of ~ q give rise to negative net investment, which is indicated by the horizontal arrows
in the gure. The _ ~ q = 0 schedule is downward sloping and shows combinations of ~ q and
~ K for which Tobin's q is constant over time. Intuitively, a higher capital stock leads to a
fall in the marginal product of capital and thus yields lower dividends to shareholders. For
points to the right of the _ ~ q = 0 schedule, the marginal product of capital is too low, so that
part of the return to capital consists of capital gains. Conversely, for points to the left of
_ ~ q = 0 schedule, the the marginal product of capital is too high, giving rise to capital losses
on investment. Hence, _ ~ q > 0 to the right of the line and _ ~ q < 0 to the left, as represented by
11Figure 1: Phase Diagrams: The Investment and Savings System
Panel (a): Investment System
q ￿
K ￿
0 [ 0] q = ￿ ￿
1 [ 0] q = ￿ ￿








Panel (b): Savings System
A ￿
X ￿
0 X = ￿ ￿
1 [ 0] A = ￿ ￿
0 [ 0] A = ￿ ￿










Notes: Panel (b) describes a special case of the model, corresponding to the benchmark calibration. The nancial wealth
schedule shifts up at impact and remains above its initial position if and only if "A   A > 0 and A("q + q)  
21("A   A) < 0, respectively. See also Appendix A.3.2.
12the vertical arrows in Figure 1. The arrow conguration conrms that the equilibrium at E0
is saddle-point stable.
Again relegating the derivations to the appendix, the savings system can be written as:



























where !X  X=Y , !A  rA=Y , and the composite terms A; A; and A are dened in
Appendix A.3. Pre-existing tax and tari rates and the relative sector sizes determine the
signs of these terms. Because the system features the capital stock in the second vector
on the right-hand side of (32), the rst shock term is time-varying. The savings system is
graphically represented in Panel (b) of Figure 1. The _ ~ X = 0 line represents combinations
of ~ X and ~ A for which aggregate full consumption does not change. The schedule is upward
sloping, owing to the generational turnover eect; that is, larger nancial wealth holdings
by households increase the gap between consumption of newborn generations and aggregate
full consumption so that aggregate full consumption must increase to keep the proportional
gap constant. If nancial wealth exceeds the equilibrium value, full consumption declines.
Conversely, if nancial wealth falls short of the equilibrium value, full consumption increases.
The _ ~ A = 0 locus depicts combinations of ~ X and ~ A for which nancial wealth is constant. This
schedule is also upward sloping, because an increase in nancial wealth supports a higher level
of full consumption. The slope of the _ ~ X = 0 line is steeper with respect to the ~ A axis than
that of the _ ~ A = 0 schedule. For points above the _ ~ A = 0 schedule, full consumption is too high,
leading to a decrease in nancial wealth. Conversely, for points below the _ ~ A = 0 schedule,
nancial wealth rises. As can be inferred from the arrow conguration, the equilibrium is
saddle-point stable.
3.2 Calibration
To get insight into the quantitative allocation and welfare eects, we calibrate the model
to match a typical low-income developing economy by using parameter values taken from
the literature and derived from primary data. Table 1 provides an overview of the chosen
parameter values. We set the world interest rate r to 4 percent (cf. Mendoza, 1991). We
choose a value of  = 0:033 to match the average crude birth rate|which is assumed to equal
the death rate|in low-income countries over the last decade (World Bank, 2009), implying an
average expected working lifetime of 33.33 years. In order to get a reasonable imports-to-GDP
share, the taste parameter " is set to 0.55.
In line with Gollin (2002), we set the output elasticity of labor in the import-substitution
sector 1   M to 0.67. Based on Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), who nd that the labor
income share in the agricultural sector is lower than that of the aggregate economy because





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14of labor in home production 1 S also takes on a value of 0.5. The productivity indexes are
chosen to get empirically plausible sectoral output levels as share of GDP. In keeping with
the RBC literature (cf. Kydland and Prescott, 1982), the rate of depreciation  is set to 0.10.














  ln  z

; (33)
where  z is a parameter that regulates the concavity of the function and therefore the mag-
nitude of the adjustment costs.16 By choosing  z = 1:25, we obtain adjustment costs on the
order of 0.4 percent of GDP, slightly above Mendoza (1991) and Heijdra and Ligthart (2010),
who work with 0.1 and 0.2 percent of GDP, respectively.
The average collected import tari rate in low-income countries is roughly 20 percent
(cf. Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp, 1999).17 Gordon and Li (2009) derive an average statutory
VAT rate across 26 emerging market and developing countries of 14.7 percent. Portes (2009)
nds an eective consumption tax rate|dened as the ratio of consumption tax revenue to
consumption|in Mexico of 8.4 percent. Therefore, we set the consumption tax rate to 12.5
percent, which lies in between the values of Gordon and Li (2009) and Portes (2009). These
initial tax and tari rates put the economy on the upward-sloping segment of the Laer curve
for total government revenue, both in the short and long run.
We normalize the stock of net foreign assets in the benchmark scenario to zero (i.e.,
F(0) = 0), which implies a pure rate of time preference of 2.9 percent. The two stable
eigenvalues amount to h
1 = 0:204 and h
2 = 0:018. Hence, the convergence speed of the
investment system is considerably higher than that of the savings system. A number of
key steady-state macroeconomic shares derived in the calibration are reported in Table 2.
Using data from the World Bank's (2009) World Development Indicators, we nd that the
employment share of the agricultural sector has been around 53 percent over the last decade
in lower middle income countries.18 Our implied employment share of 50 percent comes close
to this number. Over the last decade, imports of goods and services as a share of GDP
averaged around 37 percent in low-income countries (cf. World Bank, 2009). This number is
roughly in line with the implied share of 0.43.
The implied investment-to-GDP share of 9 percent falls short of the average GDP share
of gross capital formation in low-income countries, which amounted to roughly 21 percent
during the last decade (cf. World Bank, 2009). For our setup, in which investment only is
feasible in the import-substitution sector, a gure of 9 percent does not seem unreasonable.
16Using l'H^ opital's rule, it can be derived that lim z!1 	(I=K) = I=K, so that adjustment costs are zero
for innitely large values of  z.
17The collected import tari rate is dened as tari revenue divided by the import value (including cost,
insurance, and freight) and is typically smaller than the statutory tari rate, reecting exemptions, evasion,
and the like.
18There are no data available for the low-income group.




C (1 + tC)(1 + M)CM=Y 0.787
!E
C (1 + tC)CE=Y 0.175
!S












Y (1 + tC)YE=Y 0.576
!M
Y (1 + tC)(1 + M)YM=Y 0.424
!S





Notes: The shares are based on the parameters of the
benchmark simulation. Note that !F  rF=Y = 0.
16The implied public revenue-to-GDP share amounts to 16 percent, which is not far from the
14.1 percent that Gordon and Li (2009) nd for low-income countries. We obtain an implied
home production share of 47 percent. This value is clearly within the range of the informal
sector sizes that Schneider and Enste (2002, p. 31) report for African countries, which vary
from 20 percent to 76 percent.
4 Dynamic Allocation Eects of Tax-Tari Reform
This section considers the dynamic allocation eects of a simple strategy of osetting a tar-
i rate cut (i.e., ~ M < 0) by an increase in the destination-based consumption tax (i.e.,
~ tC =  "~ M > 0) so as to leave the consumer price index unchanged; that is, ~ pC = 0. We
assume an exogenously given initial tax and tari system. The policy change is permanent
and unanticipated in the sense that it is simultaneously announced and implemented on a
permanent basis. We rst discuss analytical allocation results for the investment system, the
labor market, and the savings system before we turn to a quantitative analysis.
4.1 Analytical and Graphical Analysis
4.1.1 Investment System
The time paths of the capital stock and Tobin's q induced by the tax-tari reform experiment




















1 measures the convergence speed of the investment system. The impact (or short-
run) eect of the reform corresponds to t = 0 and the long-run eect takes t ! 1. From
(34){(35), it can easily be seen that ~ q(0)=~ M > 0, ~ q(1)=~ M = 0, and ~ K(1)=~ M > 0 (recall
~ M < 0).
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that the reform shifts down the _ ~ q(t) = 0 locus from [_ ~ q(t) = 0]0
to [_ ~ q(t) = 0]1, whereas the _ ~ K(t) = 0 locus remains unaected. On impact, Tobin's q jumps
down, because the drop in the import tari directly decreases the marginal product of capital
in the import-substitution sector. The accompanying increase in the consumption tax rate
amplies the fall in Tobin's q through a reallocation of workers from the formal to the informal
sector, which further decreases the marginal product of capital in the import-substitution
sector. In the gure, the jump in Tobin's q is represented by the movement from the initial
equilibrium E0 to point A on the saddle path SP1. The drop in the rm's stock market value
depresses gross investment, causing the capital stock in the manufacturing sector to fall over
time. During transition, the marginal product of capital increases, so that Tobin's q slowly
17recovers until it equals its pre-shock level again. The economy moves from point A along the
saddle path to the new steady state E1, which lies to the left of the old equilibrium E0.
4.1.2 Aggregate and Sectoral Labor Markets
Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the eects on the aggregate formal labor market and Panels
(b){(d) depict the sectoral labor markets.19 On impact, the tari cut shifts the labor demand
curve in the import-substitution sector to the left [Panel (b), dashed line], reecting a lower
domestic price of import substitutes. Because the labor demand curve in the export sector
is not aected [Panel (c), solid line], the aggregate formal labor demand curve also shifts
leftward [Panel (a), negatively sloped dashed line]. Moreover, the accompanying increase in
the consumption tax rate shifts the labor supply curve in the informal sector to the right
[Panel (d), dashed line], and hence the aggregate formal labor supply curve moves to the
left [Panel (a), positively sloped dashed line]. As a result, informal employment expands on
impact at the expense of employment in the aggregate market sector. Note that in Panel (a)
the shift of the aggregate formal labor demand curve dominates the shift in the aggregate
formal labor supply curve, implying a lower wage rate on impact; that is, ~ w1 < ~ w0.20 As a
result, employment in the formal agricultural sector goes up immediately.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that the transitional decrease in the capital stock shifts the
labor demand curve of the import-substitution sector further to the left (see the dotted line).
Because the labor demand curve in the export sector is not aected [Panel (c), solid line], the
aggregate formal labor demand curve shifts leftward too [Panel (a), dotted line]. The labor
supply curve of the informal sector does not depend on the physical capital stock, implying
that the formal labor supply curve remains unchanged [Panel (a), positively sloped dashed
line]. Consequently, the market wage rate decreases from ~ w1 to the new steady-state level
~ w1 = ~ M=(1   M) < 0 and equilibrium employment in the formal sector falls from ~ LF;1 to
~ LF;1 [Panel (a) of Figure 2].
4.1.3 Savings System
This section focuses on the short-run and long-run eects of the tax-tari reform on full
consumption and nancial assets. To keep the discussion as simple as possible, we defer the
analytical solutions for the time paths of full consumption and nancial wealth to Appendix
A.3. The jump in aggregate nancial wealth is determined by the investment system and is
composed of changes in the value of the rm in the import-competing sector and in the value
19The corresponding expressions for the labor market system are given in (A.3){(A.6).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where !Z  rZ=Y and the terms on the right-hand side of the equality sign are obtained
by substituting (34) at t = 0 and ~ VZ(0) (Appendix A.3.4). The rst term between brackets
captures the direct negative eect of a fall in Tobin's q on nancial wealth. The second term
represents the increase in the value of land induced by the future decrease in the capital stock.
Intuitively, as the capital stock diminishes, part of the workers in the import-substitution
sector move to the export sector, thereby increasing the marginal product of land. Note that
this eect is absent when capital mobility is zero (i.e.,  ! 1 and thus h
1 = 0). The last
term of (36) captures the static labor reallocation eect. In economic terms, the cut in the
import tari rate decreases employment in the manufacturing sector, thereby increasing the
number of workers and the marginal product of land in the export sector (rst term in the
numerator). In contrast, the accompanying increase in the consumption tax induces workers
to move to the informal sector, which decreases employment and the marginal product of
land in the export sector (second term in the numerator).
The net impact eect on nancial wealth depends strongly on the relative employment
shares !E
L=!M
L , the adjustment speed of the investment system h
1, and the size of the informal
sector !S
L. As long as the export sector is large compared to the import-substitution sector
and the adjustment speed is not too small, the term between brackets is negative, thereby
raising nancial wealth (because ~ M < 0). Intuitively, a large relative size of the export sector
implies a large share of land in households' wealth portfolios; in that case, the eect of the
change in the value of land dominates that of the change in the value of physical capital.
Moreover, the jump in the value of land is positively aected by the adjustment speed h
1 via
a more rapid increase in the marginal product of land. The term on the second line of (36)
is negative as long as the informal sector size is not too large and thus immediately boosts
nancial wealth in that case. The reason is that the direct labor reallocation eect of the
tari cut then dominates that of the consumption tax rate increase, so that the marginal
product of labor in the export sector rises.
According to (12), full consumption depends on the change in nancial wealth and human



















  ("A   A)

~ M: (37)
The rst term represents the eect of the short-run change in nancial wealth, whereas the
second term accounts for the eect of human capital on full consumption. Human capital is
negatively aected by the future decrease in the capital stock, which depresses the wage rate
20(rst term between brackets).21 Note that this intertemporal eect disappears when capital
mobility is zero (i.e., h
1 = 0). The second term between brackets captures the (static) eect
on the return to human capital for a given level of the physical capital stock, which is positive
as long as the employment share of the informal sector is not too large.22











 < 0 and

S
 < 0 (if r <  + ) are the determinants of the investment system
and savings system, respectively (see Appendices A.2 and A.3). The rst term between
brackets in the numerator on the right-hand side represents the static eect on the return to
human capital for a given physical capital stock, which is positive as long as the employment
share of the informal sector is not too high (see footnote 22). The second term captures the
intertemporal eect of the decrease in the capital stock. Section 4.2 demonstrates that the
size of the informal sector has an important bearing on the signs of the long-run net eect on
full consumption and nancial wealth.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic eects of the reform on the savings system.
The phase diagram is drawn for the case in which the long-run eects on full consumption
and nancial wealth are positive, which corresponds to the benchmark scenario in Section
4.2. Moreover, it is assumed that the employment share of the informal sector is not too big
and that the employment share of the export sector is not too small (see Appendix A.3.2).
The reform shifts up the _ ~ A = 0 schedule to [ _ ~ A = 0]1, whereas _ ~ X = 0 remains unaected.
Initially, the economy jumps from the old equilibrium E0 to point A. Subsequently, as the
capital stock starts decumulating, the _ ~ A = 0 locus gradually shifts down so that the economy
moves from point A to the new long-run equilibrium E1.
4.2 Quantitative Transitional Dynamics
To get insight into the transitional dynamic eects of the coordinated tax-tari reform, we
simulate the calibrated model. In the simulations, we use the analytical impulse response
functions derived in Appendices A.2.2{A.3.3. The size of the tari rate cut is set to ~ M =
 0:01. We present results for 200 periods, where a period corresponds to a year. To examine
the importance of the informal sector, we distinguish three scenarios with a dierent output
share of the informal sector !S
Y  (1 + tC)YS=Y by varying the productivity parameter 
S;
the latter takes on the values 0:60, 0:85 (benchmark), and 0:95 to arrive at values for !S
Y
of 0:20, 0:47 (benchmark), and 0:63, respectively. Figure 3 shows the time proles of the
21We assume A > 0, implying that the eect of the capital stock on nancial wealth and human capital is
not dominated by the indirect eect that operates through lump-sum transfers.
22In Appendix A.3.2, we derive sucient conditions for "A  A > 0, which are easily satised for plausible
parameter values.
21variables of interest and Table 3 reports both the short-run and long-run eects. The solid
line in Figure 3 and the middle column of Table 3 correspond to the benchmark scenario. We
keep the pure rate of time preference xed across scenarios and use the initial stock of net
foreign assets as a calibration parameter.
4.2.1 Output, Employment, and Consumption
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 show that the qualitative labor market and output eects are
robust to changes in !S
Y . A larger informal sector (see the dotted lines) leads to a permanently
larger fall in output and employment in both the manufacturing and aggregate market sector.
The decline in the wage rate is less pronounced in the short run if the informal sector is large,
because formal labor supply then decreases by more. Accordingly, a larger informal sector
temporarily dampens the increase in formal agricultural employment and output, and vice
versa (see the dashed lines). The eect on long-run wages, however, is independent of the
size of the informal sector. Since the rental rate of capital is xed, the change in the long-
run capital-labor ratio in the import-competing sector|and associated with it the change
in the steady-state wage rate|is fully determined by the change in the import tari rate.
Accordingly, the increases in both formal and informal agricultural employment and output
in the long run are not aected by the size of the informal sector.
The import tari cut lowers the relative price of the imported consumption good, so that
consumption of the manufactured good increases both in the short and long run. Informal
goods consumption also goes up, because the higher consumption tax rate induces households
to substitute informal goods for formal agricultural goods. The time prole of full consump-
tion is negatively sloped (see below), so that consumption of both formal goods decreases over
time. However, consumption of the informal good increases during the transition, owing to
expanding home production as workers are leaving the import-substitution sector. A larger
informal sector amplies the decrease in the consumption of formal agricultural goods, as
more labor is relocated to production of informal agricultural goods.
4.2.2 Government Revenue
The tax-tari reform leads to an increase in government revenue, in the short run as well as
the long run [Panel (a) of Figure 3]. Although tari revenue goes down on impact, this is
more than oset by an increase in consumption tax revenue, owing to a larger consumption
tax base (which includes both domestic and imported goods). In the long run, both the
consumption tax and the import tari generate more revenue than before the reform. Import
tari revenue increases, reecting a positive tari base eect that dominates the negative
tari rate eect in the long run. The base of the import tari expands as the country imports
more consumption goods. Intuitively, manufacturing output falls, whereas consumption ofFigure 3: Transitional Dynamics of a Tax-Tari Reform
Panel (a): : Labor Market and Public Revenue
~ LF(t) ~ LM(t)


























~ LE(t) ~ LS(t)























~ w(t) ~ T(t)




















Notes: The dashed line denotes the scenario of !S
Y = 0:20, the solid line represents !S
Y = 0:47, and the dotted line depicts
!S
Y = 0:63. The other parameters are set at their benchmark values. The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and
~ tC =  "~ M.
23Panel (b): Consumption and Output
~ C(t) = ~ X(t) ~ CM(t)

























~ CE(t) ~ CS(t) = ~ YS(t)



























~ YM(t) ~ YE(t)



















Notes: The dashed line denotes the scenario of !S
Y = 0:20, the solid line represents !S
Y = 0:47, and the dotted line depicts
!S
Y = 0:63. The other parameters are set at their benchmark values. The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and
~ tC =  "~ M.Panel (c): Financial Assets and Wealth
~ q(t) ~ K(t)




















































~ Ar(t) ~ Hr(t)























Notes: The dashed line denotes the scenario of !S
Y = 0:20, the solid line represents !S
Y = 0:47, and the dotted line depicts
!S
Y = 0:63. The other parameters are set at their benchmark values. The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and
~ tC =  "~ M. Variables with an `r' in the superscript are scaled by their relative steady-state values instead of by Y .manufactured goods expands. The increase in public revenue depends negatively on the
informal sector size, through its eect on the consumption tax base.
4.2.3 Financial Assets and Human Wealth
Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows that the net impact eect on nancial wealth is positive. The
positive jump in the value of land dominates the fall in Tobin's q, because the employment
share of the export sector compared to that of the import-substitution sector and the ad-
justment speed of the investment system are large enough. Full consumption also jumps
up, implying that the negative eect of the lower future physical capital stock is not strong
enough to outweigh the immediate increase in nancial wealth and the positive static eect
on the return to human capital. The time proles of nancial wealth and full consumption
are downward sloping, owing to a rising population share of new generations, who did not
benet from the increase in nancial wealth at the time of the policy reform. Table 3 reveals
that nancial assets and human capital change in the long run by the same amount, which
equals the change in full consumption [see (12)].
The jumps in nancial wealth and full consumption are decreasing in the informal sector
size, because a larger informal sector amplies the fall in Tobin's q and dampens the initial
increase in the value of land. In the long run, however, the increase in both nancial wealth
and full consumption rises with the size of the informal sector. The reason is that a larger
informal sector increases the importance of income from home production for human capital,
which positively aects the long-run change in human capital. Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows
that the long-run eects on full consumption, nancial wealth, and human capital become
negative if the informal sector is relatively small. In terms of Panel (b) of Figure 1, the _ ~ A = 0
locus shifts down beyond its initial steady-state position.
The current account of the balance of payments turns into surplus in the short run|
reecting an immediate fall in investment|so that net foreign assets start to accumulate.
At the same time, however, imports of manufactured goods rise by more than exports of
formal agricultural goods. In the medium run, when the level of investment has settled down
at its new equilibrium value, a decit on the trade account materializes, so that net foreign
assets go down and even become negative. The stock of net foreign assets thus display a non-
monotonic adjustment path. In the new steady state, the current account is balanced again
(i.e., _ ~ F(1) = 0), implying that the interest payments on foreign debt need to be compensated
by a trade account surplus. A larger informal sector positively aects the increase in exports
by amplifying the fall in domestic consumption of the formal agricultural good, so that the
decline in steady-state net foreign assets becomes smaller.
26Table 3: Short-Run and Long-Run Allocation Eects (in Percent)
!S
Y = 0:47 !S
Y = 0:20 !S
Y = 0:63
0 1 0 1 0 1
Wealth
~ K 0.000 -8.316 0.000 -4.849 0.000 -11.599
~ q -1.359 0.000 -0.940 0.000 -1.674 0.000
~ Ar 0.964 0.027 1.180 -0.049 0.873 0.057
~ V r
Z 1.296 1.493 1.356 1.493 1.250 1.493
~ Hr 0.176 0.027 0.139 -0.049 0.187 0.057
~ F 0.000 -0.071 0.000 -0.113 0.000 -0.043
Labor Market
~ LM -2.150 -6.824 -1.419 -3.357 -2.552 -10.106
~ LE 0.581 2.985 1.063 2.985 0.315 2.985
~ LF -0.774 -1.882 -0.403 -0.762 -0.920 -2.656
~ LS 1.681 4.085 2.163 4.085 1.415 4.085
~ w -0.290 -1.493 -0.532 -1.493 -0.158 -1.493
Production
~ YM -1.441 -7.316 -0.951 -3.849 -1.710 -10.599
~ YE 0.290 1.493 0.532 1.493 0.158 1.493
~ YF -0.367 -1.853 -0.180 -1.100 -0.424 -2.290
~ YS 0.840 2.043 1.082 2.043 0.708 2.043
Consumption
~ X 0.428 0.027 0.471 -0.049 0.406 0.057
~ CM 0.878 0.477 0.921 0.401 0.856 0.507
~ CE -2.696 -7.387 -0.925 -2.525 -4.976 -14.880
Transfers
~ Tr 2.091 3.309 5.377 6.373 0.992 2.310
~ T 0.336 0.532 0.534 0.633 0.199 0.464
Foreign Sector
~ XE 1.594 5.369 2.351 6.511 1.277 5.061
~ XM -1.648 5.170 -3.969 7.939 -1.162 4.650
Notes: The parameters are set at their benchmark values in the rst column. In the second
and third column, 
S is changed to 0.60 and 0.95, implying !S
Y = 0:20 and !S
Y = 0:63,
respectively. The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and ~ tC =  "~ M. To facilitate a sound
comparison between the scenarios, variables with an `r' in the superscript are scaled by their
relative steady-state values instead of by Y .
275 Welfare Eects of Tax-Tari Reform
This section investigates the welfare eects of a consumer price-neutral tax-tari reform start-
ing from a calibrated initial equilibrium. Changes in the import tari rate and the consump-
tion tax rate have both eciency and intergenerational welfare eects. To separate these
two eects, we rst discuss the special case of innite planning horizons of households, so
that only the pure eciency eect is present. Subsequently, we analyze the eects on the
intergenerational welfare distribution using the nite-horizon model.
5.1 Eciency Eects
5.1.1 Command Outcome versus Decentralized Market Outcome
We rst look at the innite-horizon model (i.e.,  = 0) as a special case. In this case, the
model only features a steady state if the `knife-edge' condition r =  holds. The rst-best
outcome follows from a command economy in which a social planner can allocate resources






































Let us rst analyze the case without an informal sector (i.e., 
S = 0), so that the rst equality
of (40) drops out. Comparing (39){(41) with (7), (7), (19), and (23){(25) reveals that the
decentralized market equilibrium only coincides with the social planner's solution if M = 0.
Intuitively, there are no externalities in the model so that the tari rate is the only variable
distorting agents' decisions on consumption, production, and investment. Because of the tari
distortion, too much capital and labor is allocated to the manufacturing sector and too little
of the manufactured good is consumed domestically. The consumption tax is allowed to take
on any value, because it does not distort the allocation of consumption across agricultural
goods and manufactured goods. Therefore, starting from a positive pre-existing import tari
rate, the consumer price-neutral tax-tari reform always improves welfare.
If an informal sector is present (i.e., 
S > 0), then the rst equality on the left-hand
side of (40) also holds. Consequently, the consumption tax is no longer irrelevant for welfare
purposes, because it then distorts the allocation of labor between the formal and informal
sector. The decentralized market economy now only coincides with the planner's solution if
tC = M = 0. Starting from positive pre-existing consumption tax and tari rates, the con-
sumer price-neutral tax-tari reform alleviates the tari distortion at the cost of exacerbating
28Figure 4: Welfare Eects of a Tax-Tari Reform under Innite Horizons: Plausible Cases
Notes: The pre-existing tax and tari rates are: M = 0:20, tC = 0:125 (solid line), tC = 0:175 (dotted line), and
tC = 0:225 (gray line). The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and ~ tC =  "~ M.
the consumption tax distortion. Hence, the sign of the welfare change depends on the relative
magnitudes of these two eects.
5.1.2 Welfare Results













where we use the subscript RA to distinguish variables in the innite planning horizon case
from their counterparts in the overlapping generations formulation. The size of the informal
sector has two opposing eects on the welfare change induced by the tax reform: (i) the
consumption tax distortion increases (yielding a negative eect); and (ii) the tari distortion
gets smaller (yielding a positive eect). If the pre-existing consumption tax distortion is
large compared to the pre-existing import tari distortion, the negative eect dominates the
positive eect so that a larger informal sector negatively inuences the change in welfare.
Conversely, if the pre-existing import tari distortion is large compared to the pre-existing
consumption tax distortion, the positive eect on the welfare change exceeds the negative
eect for a specic range of informal sector sizes.
Figure 4 studies the eect of the informal sector size on the welfare change by varying
the initial consumption tax rate. The welfare change is a monotonically negative function of
the informal sector size if the initial consumption tax rate is high, whereas the relationship
23The term capturing the price eect on lifetime welfare drops out, reecting the price-neutrality of the
tax-tari reform.
29Figure 5: Welfare Eects of a Tax-Tari Reform under Innite Horizons: Extreme Cases
Panel (a): Various M values and tC = 0:20 Panel (b): Various tC values and M = 0:15
Notes: In Panel (a), the pre-existing tax and tari rates are: tC = 0:20, M = 0:05 (solid line), M = 0:10 (dotted
line), M = 0:15 (gray line). In Panel (b), the pre-existing tax and tari rates are: M = 0:15, tC = 0:20 (solid
line), tC = 0:30 (dotted line), and tC = 0:40 (gray line). The policy shock consists of ~ M =  0:01 and ~ tC =  "~ M.
is non-monotonous if the initial consumption tax is low. On the upward-sloping part of
the schedule, the fall in the tari rate distortion dominates the rise in the consumption tax
distortion, whereas on the downward-sloping part the rise in the consumption tax distortion
is dominant. Although the pure eciency eect may thus be decreasing in the size of the
informal sector, it remains positive for all empirically plausible pre-existing tax and tari
rates. Figure 5 depicts two unrealistic parameter settings, in which case the welfare eect
does become negative. In Panel (a), we choose a rather high consumption tax rate (i.e.,
tC = 0:20) and vary the import tari rate between 0.05 and 0.15. In Panel (b), we set an
unrealistically low import tari rate (i.e., M = 0:05) and pick values of the consumption tax
rate in the range 0.10 and 0.30. Hence, only the combination of an unrealistically low import
tari rate and a rather high consumption tax rate (assuming 
S > 0) renders the welfare
eect negative.
Our welfare ndings for plausible conditions dier qualitatively from the results derived
in a static model with an informal sector (cf. Emran and Stiglitz, 2005), because we take
into account the distortionary eect of import taris on the investment decision of rms. As
a result, a reduction in the import tari rate is more benecial in a dynamic model than in
a static constellation.
305.2 Intergenerational Distribution Eects
We now turn to the model with a positive birth rate (i.e.,  > 0), where we have to take
into account that generations dier in the amount of wealth they have accumulated and
therefore are aected dierently by the reform. We distinguish between existing generations
(represented by generation index v < 0) and future generations (represented by generation
index v = t  0), where the time at which the policy reform takes place is normalized to t = 0.
The welfare eect for existing generations is dened as the change in expected lifetime utility
at the time of the reform d(v;0), whereas the welfare eect for future generations is dened
as the change in expected lifetime utility evaluated at birth d(t;t). By log-linearizing (1),






Existing generations are born before the implementation of the policy shock and thus have al-
ready accumulated nancial assets. Equation (12) shows that full consumption is a xed frac-
tion of total wealth. Following Bovenberg (1993), the average welfare eect of the generations
currently alive is given by:













where !H  rH=Y . Hence, the average welfare eect is a weighted average of the change in
nancial wealth and human capital of existing generations. The coordinated tax-tari reform
boosts nancial wealth at the time of the policy change, because the increase in the value
of land|due to a current and future reallocation of labor to the export sector|dominates
the negative wealth eect of the fall in Tobin's q. Human capital is positively aected by
an expansion of the informal sector|via the implicit income of informal workers|and a rise
in lump-sum transfers and negatively by the drop in the wage bill of formal workers. In the
benchmark scenario, human capital increases, reecting the dominant eect of an increase
in home production and lump-sum transfers. For plausible parameter values, the average
welfare eect for the existing generations is positive as well.
Under the assumption that every existing generation has the same relative shares of equity
and land in its portfolio, the welfare change for generation v is given by:





+ e(r )v ~ H(0)
!H
; (45)
where 0 < e(r )v < 1 is the share of human wealth in the household's wealth portfolio,
which is decreasing in the generation's age. For relevant parameters, we nd that the reform
increases both short-run nancial wealth and human capital, where nancial wealth rises by
31more than human capital. Old generations benet to a larger extent from the reform than
young existing generations as the share of nancial assets in their wealth portfolio is larger.
5.2.2 Future Generations
Future generations are born without any nancial assets, so that the change in their full
consumption level at birth is fully determined by the change in human capital. Therefore,
the change in lifetime utility of future generations is given by:




The coordinated tax-tari reform leads to a downward sloping time prole of human capi-
tal as a result of the dominant eect of declining proles of both wages and formal employ-
ment.24 Intuitively, future generations have a smaller capital stock to work with than existing
generations and are therefore less productive. Hence, the change in lifetime utility for future
generations is decreasing in the year of birth.
5.2.3 Welfare Proles: Numerical Evidence
Figure 6 shows the intergenerational welfare proles resulting from our benchmark calibra-
tion.25 Because the initial distortions|and thus the welfare eects|depend on the GDP
share of the informal sector and on the pre-existing tax and tari rates, three dierent cases
are considered. Panel (a) depicts the eect for various sizes of the informal sector, Panel
(b) illustrates the eect for various initial import tari rates and a given consumption tax
rate, and Panel (c) shows the eect for various pre-existing consumption tax rates and a
given tari rate. A larger informal sector dampens the jump in nancial wealth, but am-
plies the jump in human capital. Therefore, it reduces welfare of old existing generations
(who depend heavily on nancial wealth) and benets future generations (who only consume
out of human capital). Increasing the initial import tari rate (and thus the import tari
distortion) positively aects the welfare change of most generations. However, the welfare
change of old existing generations becomes smaller because the higher import tari leads to
a larger share of domestic capital in the aggregate wealth portfolio, which depresses the jump
in nancial wealth. As one would expect, increasing the initial consumption tax rate (and
thus the consumption tax distortion) shifts down the welfare prole.
Table 4 presents the average welfare change of existing generations for dierent combina-
tions of pre-existing tax and tari rates and sizes of the informal sector. The welfare gain
24The fall in the wage bill dominates the increase in home production and the change in lump-sum transfers.
25The downward sloping lines on the interval [ 100;0] are only valid under the assumption that every
existing generation has the same relative shares of capital and land in its asset portfolio. This assumption does








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34depends positively on the pre-existing tari rate and negatively on the pre-existing consump-
tion tax rate. Moreover, the size of the informal sector negatively aects the average welfare
gain.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a dynamic micro-founded model of a small open developing economy with
an informal sector to study the revenue, eciency, and intergenerational welfare eects of
a coordinated reform of taris and taxes. More specically, we analyze a simple strategy
of osetting a cut in import taris by an increase in destination-based consumption taxes,
so as to leave the consumer price index unchanged. Our model features both an informal
and formal agricultural sector and a formal manufacturing sector. We derive analytically the
allocation eects of the reform. To quantify the dynamic allocation and welfare eects, we
simulate the model that is calibrated to match the characteristics of a typical small open
developing economy.
We nd that the reform strategy increases steady-state government revenue, imports, and
exports. In addition, long-run economic activity in both the informal and formal agricultural
sector expands at the expense of the import-competing manufacturing sector; however, infor-
mal agricultural output rises relatively more. Aggregate formal employment and output go
down, more so in the long run than in the short run. The qualitative allocation eects for
output and employment are robust to changes in the size of the informal sector. For plausible
parameter values, eciency improves. Intuitively, the reform alleviates the tari distortion
(yielding too much production and too little consumption of import substitutes) more than
it exacerbates the consumption tax distortion (giving rise to excess home production). More
specically, lower tari rates depress capital accumulation in the (at the margin) inecient
import-substitution sector and thus yield a larger welfare gain than in static models. Ignor-
ing the endogeneity of rms' input use may thus give rise to misleading policy conclusions.
The welfare gain is unequally distributed across generations. Old existing generations benet
more than young and future generations, who may even become worse o if the pre-existing
import tari rate is low or the informal sector is relatively small.
Our study assumed frictionless labor and capital markets. Future research will focus on
extending the model to include factor market imperfections, which are a relevant feature of
developing countries. In addition, we will generalize the production structure and allow for
intermediate inputs. Because the informal sector is hard to tax at the retail stage, developing
countries often try to collect some revenue from this sector by using withholding taxes on
(imported) intermediate inputs.
35Appendix
This Appendix sets out the solution procedure. It derives quasi-reduced forms, analyzes
stability, and derives the comparative dynamics of a consumer-price neutral reform: ~ tC =
 "~ M.
A.1 Quasi-Reduced Forms
The model is log-linearized around an initial steady state in which F(0) = 0. Table A.1
summarizes the model. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change (e.g., ~ X(t)  dX(t)=X) for
most variables. Exceptions are the following: (i) nancial assets A(t), VZ(t), and F(t) and
human capital H(t), which are scaled by GDP and multiplied by r (e.g., ~ A(t)  rdA(t)=Y );
(ii) lump-sum transfers T(t), which are scaled by GDP only (e.g., ~ T(t)  dT(t)=Y ); and (iii)
tax and tari rates, which are dened as ~ tC  dtC=(1 + tC) and ~ M  dM=(1 + M). Time
derivatives of variables are generally dened as _ ~ X  _ X(t)=X, except for _ ~ A(t)  r _ A(t)=Y ,
_ ~ F(t)  r _ F(t)=Y , and _ ~ VZ(t)  r _ VZ(t)=Y . We use the shares reported in Table 2. In the
following, we will drop time subscripts.
We condense the production side of the model to quasi-reduced form expressions in the










M 0 0 1
0 E 0 1































where the determinant of the coecient matrix 















































































L ~ LM = !S
L~ LS from (T.18), where !F
L  !E
L + !M
L . By substituting this result








( ~ w   ~ tC): (A.7)
The aggregate labor demand curve for the formal sector is obtained by substituting (T.11)
into !F
L ~ LF = !E
L ~ LE + !M
L ~ LM:
!F










~ w + !M





By using (T.7){(T.10) and (T.16), we can simplify the consumption side of the model to
quasi-reduced form expressions, including as arguments the non-predetermined variable ~ X,
the state variable ~ K, and the policy variables ~ tC and ~ M:









































By substituting (T.14), (A.3), (A.9), and (A.10) into (T.19), we nd the quasi-reduced form
expression for government revenue:
~ T = K ~ K + X ~ X + M~ M + C~ tC; (A.11)
where K and X capture pure tax and tari base eects, whereas C and M contain a
combination of tax and tari rate and base eects:
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A.2.1 Stability and Long-Run Eects
The investment system (31) is obtained by substituting (T.13), (T.14), and the quasi-reduced
form equation (A.3) into (T.1) and (T.2). The system features one predetermined variable
37~ K and one non-predetermined variable ~ q. The determinant of the rst coecient matrix I
on the right-hand side of (31) is given by:

I
 =  1221 < 0: (A.12)












1 + r > 0: (A.13)
Because there is one positive (unstable) eigenvalue and one negative (stable) eigenvalue, the
model has a unique and saddle-point stable steady state.














where we used the consumer-price neutrality of the policy reform. By solving this system, we





~ q(1) = 0: (A.16)
A.2.2 Initial Eect and Transitional Dynamics
We use the Laplace transform method of Judd (1982) to derive analytical expressions for
the transitional dynamics of the model. The Laplace transform is dened as Lfx;sg 
R 1
0 x(t)e stdt, where s represents the discount rate and L is the Laplace transform operator.









~ q(0)   (q + "q)Lf~ M;sg
#
; (A.17)













~ q(0)   (q + "q)Lf~ M;sg
#
; (A.18)










The adjoint matrix of I(s) is given by:
adjI(s) 
"



















We examine an unanticipated and permanent shock to the system, so that Lf~ M;sg = ~ M=s.






By taking the inverse Laplace transform of the rst and second row of (A.17) and imposing
(A.22), we obtain (34){(35) as reported in the main text.
A.3 Savings System
A.3.1 Stability and Long-Run Eects
The savings system (32) is obtained by substituting (T.16) and the quasi-reduced form equa-
tions (A.3){(A.6), and (A.11) into (T.3) and (T.4); it features one predetermined variable ~ X
and one non-predetermined variable ~ A.26 The determinant of the rst coecient matrix S
on the right-hand side is given by:






=  (r + )(   r + )   (1   )2; (A.23)
where we have used (T.3). The system has a unique and saddle-path stable steady state if
 S  < 0, in which case there is one positive (unstable) and one negative (stable) real root.
It follows from (A.23) that












2 + r > 0: (A.24)
The long-run eects of the reform are obtained by evaluating (32) in steady state:
"

























































26Strictly speaking, the variable ~ A is not completely predetermined. The non-predetermined part of it,
however, is already determined by the investment system.






r(r   )!I [A("q + q)   21("A   A)]
!K!A jIjjSj
~ M: (A.29)
A.3.2 Proof of Signs
This section rst gives three sucient (but not necessary) conditions for "A  A > 0. After






























(1 + tC)   !S
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The terms between brackets in the rst, second, and third line are positive if E  M,
"!S
L=!E
L < S=E, and (1 + M)(M   tC)!M
L !S
L < 1 + (1   ")M, respectively. These three
conditions are easily satised for plausible parameter values.




















A.3.3 Initial Eect and Transitional Dynamics














where S(s)  sI  S. We premultiply both sides of (A.31) by S(s) 1, use Cramer's rule,




















The adjoint matrix of S(s) is given by:
adjS(s) 
"
s   r  
r 
!A
 r!X s   (r   )
#
: (A.33)
40Eliminating the positive (unstable) root that violates the transversality condition for rms in







































By substituting the jump in the value of land that is derived in Appendix A.3.4, equation
(37) in the main text is obtained. We dene the following temporary transition terms:
T1(h
i;t)  e h











































By taking the inverse Laplace transform of the rst row of (A.31), and imposing (A.34), we
obtain the transition path for full consumption:
~ X(t) = T1(h
2;t) ~ X(0)   [1   T1(h
2;t)]




















Similarly, the transition path for nancial wealth is obtained by taking the inverse Laplace
transform of the second row of (A.31) and imposing (A.34):
~ A(t) = T1(h
2;t)
h
!K~ q(0) + ~ VZ(0)
i
+ [1   T1(h
2;t)]











A.3.4 Value of Land































41Imposing the transversality condition for the aggregate household sector gives the jump in
the value of land:



















To obtain the transitional dynamics for the value of land, we take the inverse Laplace trans-
form of (A.40) and substitute (A.41) for ~ VZ(0):






























[lnX(v;z)   lnpC(v;z)]e (+)(z t)dz: (A.43)
It follows from (8) that full consumption on the optimal path obeys X(v;z) = X(v;t)e(r )(z t).










The change in utility (43) follows from dierentiating (A.44).
A.4.1 Existing Generations (v < 0)
Existing generations are born before the policy shock occurs and have already accumulated
nancial assets. Their level of full consumption at the time of the shock (t = 0) is given by
(12), so that we nd:














r!X ~ X(0)   ~ A(0): (A.46)
Assuming that the economy was in the same steady-state equilibrium before the shock oc-
curred, we have X(v;0) = X(v;v)e (r )v. Combining this with (12) yields:
(+)[A(v;0) + H(0)] = X(v;v)e (r )v = (+)H(0)e (r )v ) (v;0) = e(r )v; (A.47)
42where we have used A(v;v) = 0 and H(v) = H(0) for the second equality. Under the
assumption that the relative share of capital and land in the wealth portfolio is the same for
all existing generations, we have ~ A(v;0) = ~ A(0). By substituting this equality and (A.47)
into (A.45) and using (43), we obtain (45) in the main text.
A.4.2 Future Generations (v = t  0)
Future generations are born without nancial capital A(v;v) = 0, implying that (v;t) = 1







Table A1: The Log-Linearized Model




~ I   ~ K

(T.1)
_ ~ q = r
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~ YM   ~ K + ~ M
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(T.2)







_ ~ A = r
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L )(~ LF + ~ w) + ~ T   !X ~ X + !
S
Y (~ YS + ~ tC)
i
(T.4)






L )(~ LF + ~ w) + ~ T + !
S
Y (~ YS + ~ tC)
i
(T.5)
_ ~ VZ = r

~ VZ   !Z~ rE

(T.6)












C) ~ CS (T.7)
~ X = ~ pM + ~ CM = ~ pA + ~ CA (T.8)
~ X = ~ pC + ~ C; ~ pC = "~ pM + (1   ")~ pA (T.9)
~ pM = ~ tC + ~ M; ~ pA = ~ pE = ~ tC (T.10)
~ w = ~ M + M( ~ K   ~ LM) =  E ~ LE = ~ pA   S ~ LS (T.11)
~ rE = (1   E)~ LE (T.12)
~ q = (~ I   ~ K) (T.13)
~ YM = (1   M)~ LM + M ~ K (T.14)
~ YE = (1   E)~ LE (T.15)
~ YS = (1   S)~ LS (T.16)
~ A = !K(~ q + ~ K) + ~ VZ + ~ F (T.17)
0 = !
M
L ~ LM + !
E
L ~ LE + !
S
L~ LS (T.18)




























tC + M + tCM
(1 + M)(1 + tC)
!
M
C ~ CM (T.19)
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